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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 12 SPRING 1984 NUMBER 1
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACCIDENTAL MEANS AND
ACCIDENTAL RESULTS IN ACCIDENTAL DEATH
INSURANCE
JOHN DWIGHT INGRAM* AND LYNNE R. OsTmi.D**
Most insurance policies which provide for the payment of bene-
fits upon the "accidental death" of the insured do not define the
word "accidental" anywhere in the policy. Certain acts such as sui-
cide are often excluded, but the concept of what is truly an "acci-
dental" event is left to the interpretation of the reader. Where
there is a conflict in the interpretations urged by the insurance
company and the insured's designated beneficiary, courts tend to
favor the beneficiary. Thus courts generally give the word "acci-
dental" what they consider to be its ordinary meaning,' such as
"something which happens by chance or fortuitously, without in-
tention or design, and which is unexpected, unusual and
unforeseen."'
The corollary of this construction is that a result which is fore-
seeable3 and which is the natural and probable consequence of an
act or course of action cannot be said to be produced by "acciden-
tal means."' 4 However, over the years most courts have adopted an
increasingly liberal attitude in their interpretation of accidental
* A.B. 1950, Harvard University;, J.D. 1966, John Marshall Law School Professor of
Law, John Marshall Law SchooL Formerly partner, Simon & Ingram, specializing in insur-
ance litigation; insurance broker, Griffin, Ingram, and Pfaff.
" B.A. 1970, M.A. 1972, University of Illinois. Educational Consultant, Illinois State
Board of Education, 1973--.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the help of Professor Ingram's very capable research
assistants, Sandra Freeman Kravitt and Eric Karr. Ms. Kravitt was an Illinois Bar Founda-
tion Research Fellow in 1983.
1. See, e.g., Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Potter, 330 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa 1983).
2. Taylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 N.E.2d 5, 6 (m. 1957).
3. Foreseeable: a contingency "known to all sensible men as likely to follow" as a natural
result of one's conduct. Hutton v. States Acc. Ins. Co., 108 N.E. 296, 297 (ilL 1915).
4. See, e.g., Korfin v. Continental Cas. Co., 74 A2d 312, 312 (N.J. 1950) (death from
postvaccinal encephalitis resulting from smallpox vaccination voluntarily undergone by in-
sured; court held that insured's reaction to vaccine was wholly unanticipated, thereby con-
stituting "accidental means").
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death provisions in insurance policies. In some states we seem to
have reached the point where death will be considered "acciden-
tal" unless the insured's actions were so likely to result in death
that his conduct was tantamount to attempting suicide. Not only
do some states seem to be rapidly draining Justice Cardozo's Ser-
bonian Bog' of its capacity to engulf us in endless litigation, but
they may well be close to creating an endless desert where insurers
will be left without hope for defending against accidental death
claims.
I. EARLY HISTORY
The question of what constitutes "accidental means" is not a
new one. It was at issue in the United States Supreme Court al-
most one hundred years ago in United States Mutual Accident
Association v. Barry.7 Dr. Barry had jumped about four feet from
a platform to the ground. When he landed on the ground, he re-
ceived a jar and sudden wrenching of his body, which resulted in a
stricture of the duodenum, from the effect of which he soon died.
Dr. Barry had been insured under a policy providing a death bene-
fit if death was occasioned by "bodily injuries ... effected through
• . . accidental means." The jury was instructed, in substance,
that death was by "accidental means" if there had been some un-
expected movement of the insured's body, or if he had landed on
the ground in an unintended manner. If, however, his movements
and landing during the jump were just as he had intended, then
only the resulting injury was "accidental," and therefore his death
was not by "accidental means." Finding these instructions to be
correct, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court on a jury verdict for the beneficiary. The Court found that
there was evidence from which the jury could have found that
5. See, e.g., Taylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 N.E.2d at 6 (death of in-
sured in fire which started accidentally while insured and others were preparing to burn
down the insured's house in order to recover on fire policy; held, death by "accidental
means").
6. In his dissenting opinion in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499
(1934), Justice Cardozo warned that distinguishing between "accidental means" and "acci-
dental results" "will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog." (Lake Serbonis
was a marshy lake in Egypt in which whole armies were engulfed, according to reports of
Herodotus, a Greek Historian circa 400 B.C.)
7. 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
8. Id. at 107.
9. Id. at 109-10, 117-18.
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something unusual or unexpected occurred during the jump.'"
Barry set forth the rules which guided the courts for many years
thereafter:
1. An injury may be caused by "accidental means" even
though "the act which precedes the injury" was a voluntary and
intentional act, if "something unforeseen, unexpected, [and] un-
usual occurs which produces the injury . ""
2. An injury is not caused by "accidental means" if it is "such
as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not
unusual or unexpected way.'
12
During the next forty-five years a number of courts applied
these rules and distinguished between "accidental means" and "ac-
cidental results." Recovery was denied where there was nothing
unusual or unexpected in the act preceding the injury, and only
the result was unexpected. If, however, something unforeseen or
unexpected occurred during an otherwise voluntary and inten-
tional act, recovery would be permitted.
Some courts were willing to make rather fine distinctions in
characterizing the "act" or "means" which produced the injury,
thereby affording the beneficiaries relief. For example, where an
insured died from typhoid fever after unknowingly drinking pol-
luted water, the court held that he had intended to drink pure
water. Therefore, the means was drinking polluted water, an unin-
tended act, and hence was accidental." In another case, where the
insured got lost on a hunting trip and froze to death, the court said
that the means which caused the death was accidental exposure to
the storm and frost, rather than the voluntary and intended act of
tracking game."
Other courts have shown a willingness to look for something un-
foreseen and unusual in the means, but have required the plaintiff
to show clearly that something unexpected was indeed present in
the act.' 5 For example, where an insured contracted a streptococcic
10. Id. at 121.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Christ v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 144 N.E. 161 (Ill. 1924). Accord Newsoms v.
Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 137 S.E. 456 (Va. 1927) (ptomaine poisoning or acute indigestion
after eating canned beans; court said insured intended to eat nourishing food, but instead
ate tainted food; thus means was accidental).
14. Ashley v. Agricultural Life Ins. Co. of America, 217 N.W. 27 (Mich. 1928).
15. In both Newsoms and Ashley, the court found accidental means as a matter of law.
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infection through a cut on his chin, the court said that the plaintiff
had to show both that the cut was inflicted by accidental means
and that the infection entered his body at the same time.1 How-
ever, where it was clear that germs had entered an insured's body
through an opening which was not caused by accident, the cause of
death was held to be disease, which did not constitute "accidental
means."
17
Where the insured has done exactly what he intended to do,
however, courts applying the Barry test have denied recovery, even
when the "result" of the act was unforeseen.18 In these cases the
courts have found that the "insured did nothing but that which he
intended to do," and injury or death was the natural result from a
natural cause.19 Similarly, where a medical or dental procedure was
intentionally and skillfully performed, but an unexpected and un-
fortunate result ensued, the courts following the Barry test have
held that death was not by "accidental means" because only the
result was accidental.2
A few courts have shown a willingness to depart from the Barry
distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental results,"
and to adopt the position that "accident," "accidental" and "acci-
dental means" are synonymous.2 In some cases the courts' state-
ments of this view were undoubtedly dictum, because the means
might well have been found to be "accidental" anyway.2 In other
16. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Erickson, 42 F.2d 997 (8th Cir. 1930) (judgment for
beneficiary reversed; remanded for new trial).
17. Kimball v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 117 A. 228 (R.I. 1922) (doctor had open boil on
neck; erysipelas germs from patients he was treating entered his body through the open
boil).
18. See, e.g., Smith v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 106 N.E. 607 (Mass. 1914) (insured used nasal
douche; sniffed too hard; this carried germs into middle ear and eventually to the brain,
causing spinal meningitis).
19. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 110 N.E. 475, 476 (Ohio 1914) (insured took a
cold bath after horseback riding; the shock of the cold water caused a heart attack). Accord
Rock v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 156 P. 1029 (Cal. 1916) (heart failure from overexertion in carry-
ing heavy casket down stairs); Husbands v. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Ass'n, 133 N.E. 130 (Ind.
1921) (ruptured blood vessel due to exertion in shaking down ashes in furnace).
20. Caldwell v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 267 S.W. 907 (Mo. 1924) (hernia operation, skillfully
performed; intestinal obstruction developed and caused death). But cf. International Trav-
elers' Ass'n v. Francis, 23 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1930) (infection following extraction of
tooth; court affirmed the appellate court's reversal of a judgment for the insurer; result "so
extraordinary and rare, and so unrelated to the surgical act performed, that it must be re-
garded as accidental").
21. See, e.g., the cases cited by Justice Cardozo in his dissent in Landress v. Phoenix
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1934).
22. E.g., Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Stephens, 49 S.W.2d 364 (Ark. 1932) (insured
came to aid of friend who unexpectedly got into a fight with a man not known to be armed;
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cases, however, it was clear that only the result was "accidental,"
and the means was not, as where a common anesthetic was given to
the insured,2" or where the insured died of carbon monoxide
poisoning and was found in an enclosed garage with the car motor
running.2 4
These attempts by the courts to find a rational and acceptable
basis for their decisions in "accidental means" cases were sharply
crystalized in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.,25
decided by the Supreme Court in 1934. Despite the fact that Lan-
dress was never binding on the state courts, and after Erie26 in
1938 was also not binding on federal courts in diversity actions,
both the majority and dissenting opinions have been looked to for
guidance throughout the ensuing fifty years.
In Landress, the insured, "while in good health and while play-
ing golf in his accustomed manner at a place where many others
were playing without injury, was suddenly and unexpectedly over-
come from the force of the sun's rays ... and . . . shortly after-
ward. . . died. ' 27 In affirming the judgments of the lower courts in
favor of defendant insurer, the majority of the Supreme Court
noted that "the carefully chosen words [in the policy] defining lia-
bility distinguish between the result and the external means which
produces it.' 8 There was nothing in the pleadings to suggest that
there was anything unknown or unforeseen in the sun's rays, the
weather or any other circumstances, 29 and thus the test for "acci-
dental means" set down in Barrys0 had not been satisfied.
In his now famous dissent, Justice Cardozo stated that it is the
insured was cut with a knife, either by accident or on purpose; judgment on jury verdict for
disabled insured affirmed); Hoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 254 N.W. 137 (Mich. 1934) (abra-
sion, which was caused by being left on bedpan too long, became infected; judgment on jury
verdict for plaintiff affirmed; a liberal court might find that the cause of the abrasion was
accidental); Carter v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 238 P. 259 (Utah 1925) (death was caused
either because insured became dizzy and fell, or because he took overdose of sleeping pills).
23. Wheeler v. Title Guar. & Cas. Co., 251 N.W. 408 (Mich. 1933) (injection of nuper-
caine; judgment for plaintiff affirmed; effect was not the natural and probable consequence
of the means).
24. Wiger v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 236 N.W. 534 (Wis. 1931) (judgment on jury verdict
for plaintiff affirmed; jury found that death was not suicide and could have found that the
result was not foreseeable).
25. 291 U.S. 491 (1934).
26. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 495 (1934).
28. Id. at 496.
29. Id.
30. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
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reading of the policy [by the average man] that is to be accepted
as our guide, with the help of the established rule that ambigui-
ties and uncertainties are to be resolved against the [insurance]
company.. . . When a man has died in such a way that his death
is spoken of as an accident, he has died because of an accident,
and hence by accidental means.'
Thus the two conflicting views were clearly presented: where the
insured's act is intentional and voluntary, must there be something
unexpected, unusual and unforeseen in the act itself in order to
constitute "accidental means," or is it sufficient if only the "result"
is "accidental"? During the ensuing fifty years many courts have
wrestled with this issue, and a broad spectrum of views has
developed.
II. THE STRICT TEST
A number of courts have continued to apply the strict test set
down by the majority in Landress.32 Under this approach, the dif-
ference between "accidental means" and "accidental results" is
analogous to that between cause and effect.3 3 When nothing un-
foreseen or unintended occurs in the performance of the injurious
act, and the only unanticipated factor is the result-that is, death
or injury-then the consequence is an "accidental result." Because
the act was performed as intended, such consequences are not
caused by "accidental means." Only when an unusual, unforeseen
and unintended mishap occurs in the performance of the act itself
are the results considered the product of "accidental means. 314
The rationale for this strict interpretation is that to refuse to make
a distinction between "means" and "results" would be to create a
contract for the parties different from that into which they actu-
ally entered. 5
While there are a substantial number of states which must still
be listed as adhering to the "means/results" distinction,6 the like-
lihood of their continued loyalty to this strict test is questionable.
31. Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. at 499 (Cardozo, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
32. See Appendix, infra, for a state-by-state listing.
33. Note, "Accident" and "Accidental Means" in Indiana, 36 IND. L.J. 376, 376-77
(1961).
34. Kluge v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees, 149 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1967).
35. Van Schaick, Accidental Means In New York-A Rational Approach, 32 CORNELL
L.Q. 378, 382 (1947).
36. See Appendix, infra.
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There appear to be only five jurisdictions in which the highest
court has, in the last twenty years, announced its adherence to the
strict test in a case where the distinction would determine the out-
come of the case.3 In a number of other jurisdictions the court's
statement of the rule was dictum, because both the means and the
result were "accidental,"3 because neither the means nor the re-
sult was "accidental,"3 9 or for other reasons. 40 Furthermore, in sev-
eral states the question of what test to apply has not been
presented to the highest courts for many years.4 ' Where a state's
37. Chelly v. Home Ins. Co., 293 A.2d 295 (Del. 1972), aff'g 285 A.2d 810 (Del. Super. Ct.
1971) (insured sustained herniated lumbar disc while bowling; summary judgment for in-
surer; affirmed); Smith v. Continental Cas. Co., 203 A.2d 168 (D.C. 1964) (heart attack after
exertion in climbing embankment in performance of regular duties as engineer; directed
verdict for insurer; affirmed); Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338 (Md. 1970)
(death caused by hypersensitivity to heroin insured injected, or impurities therein, or syner-
gistic reaction; directed verdict for insurer; affirmed); Kluge v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employ-
ees, 149 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1967) (heart attack after lifting and moving railroad handcar;
judgment n.o.v. for insurer; affirmed); Henderson v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 150 S.E.2d
17 (N.C. 1966) (fireman died from heart attack due to smoke inhalation after fighting fire;
demurrer sustained; affirmed). In each of these cases it would appear that the result was
accidental.
38. Commercial Ins. Co. v. Orr, 379 F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1967) (applying Missouri law)
(aspiration of vomitus by alcoholic after drinking; court said that jury could find cause of
death was failure of epiglottis to close air passage, which was unexpected); Wiecking v.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1940) (applying Indiana law) (sunstroke
while playing golf; court said sunstroke could be accidental means in Indiana, but did not
say what unusual or unexpected occurrence produced the injury in this case); Emergency
Aid Ins. Co. v. Dobbs, 83 So. 2d 335 (Ala. 1955) (carpenter was walking up ramp on job; saw
sparks falling, and looked up into flash of electric torch, which injured his eyes; court said
that jury could find he did not voluntarily expose his unprotected eyes to the flash of the
torch); Ells v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 125 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1942)
(insured fell on bathroom floor); King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 192 A. 311 (Conn. 1937) (injury
due to dentist's overexposure to x-ray over period of time; court said he intended exposure
to x-ray, but did not intend overexposure); Wills v. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 91 P.2d 695
(Mont. 1939) (death from exposure and freezing when insured got off street car at wrong
stop in minus-40-degree weather; court said exposure to severe weather was not intended);
Dalbey v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 74 P.2d 432 (Mont. 1937) (death of fireman from
smoke inhalation while manning hose outside burning barn; court said smoke inhalation was
not expected under the circumstances).
39. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 86 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1935) (insured was aggres-
sor, and victim shot him in self-defense; court held that insured knew or should have antici-
pated that intended victim might kill him); Smith v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 120
S.E.2d 267 (Va. 1961) (insured, a fugitive, hid in barn and shot at police; tear gas shells fired
into barn set it on fire, and insured burned to death; court said injury or death was foresee-
able, and was not an accident).
40. Lavender v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 157 So. 101 (Miss. 1934) (there was no
visible contusion or wound, as required by the policy, and a "violation of law" exclusion
applied because insured was attacking a constable).
41. King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 192 A. 311 (Conn. 1937); Lavender v. Volunteer State Life
Ins. Co., 157 So. 101 (Miss. 1934); Wills v. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 91 P.2d 695 (Mont.
1984]
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adherence to the "means/results" distinction rests either upon dic-
tum or upon an old case, it is certainly possible that the court
would abolish the distinction if the question were directly
presented in a future case.
Even the courts in states which still purport to follow the strict
view have occasionally gone out of their way to find something un-
foreseen in the "means" of an insured's death in order to allow
recovery. For example, where an insured's death was caused by
sunstroke and heat exhaustion, the Ohio court held that the
"means" of death was not the insured's voluntary act of working in
the sun, but rather was the effect of the heat and rays of the sun
upon the insured, which was unexpected and unintended. 42 Simi-
larly, where an insured suffered from ptomaine poisoning or acute
indigestion after eating canned beans, the Virginia court held that
he intended to eat nourishing food, but inadvertently ate tainted
food, and therefore the "means" was "accidental." 4
Finally, some states which still recognize a distinction between
"means" and "results" have adopted a definition of "accidental
means" which is so liberal that it results in recovery in most cases
anyway. Typical of this approach is Perrine v. Prudential Insur-
ance Co. of America,44 in which the New Jersey court adopted as
its test the "reasonable expectations of the average policyholder. '45
In Perrine, peritonitis developed from a break in the insured's in-
testine caused by pressure on his abdomen from heavy equipment
which he was moving. The court, stating that this was a traumatic
incident, indicated that the jury could find that the injury was
caused by something "accidental. '46 As pointed out by the dissent,
1939) (It should also be noted that in Terry v. National Farmers Union Life Ins. Co., while
the court did not discuss the "means/results" distinction, it did say that "an accidental
result may follow an intentional act and be regarded as caused by accidental means." 356
P.2d at 978 (Mont. 1960)); McGinley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 184 A. 593 (N.H.
1936); Hammer v. Mutual Beneficial Health & Acc. Ass'n, 109 N.E.2d 649 (Ohio 1952); Kim-
ball v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 117 A. 228 (R.I. 1922).
42. Hammer v. Mutual Beneficial Health & Acc. Ass'n, 109 N.E.2d 649 (Ohio 1952). See
also King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 192 A. 311 (Conn. 1937) (dentist's overexposure to x-ray over
period of time; court said he intended exposure to x-ray, but did not intend overexposure).
43. Newsoms v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 137 S.E. 456 (Va. 1927).
44. 265 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1970).
45. Id. at 524. The court said:
[Tlhe issue for the fact-finder to determine is whether the average policyholder
would consider that there was something about the preceding acts and events, in
the light of the unexpected injurious result ... which would lead him reasonably
to call the means "accidental," even though, strictly speaking, nothing unexpected
or unforeseen occurred in the course of the preceding acts.
46. Id. at 525.
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it is difficult to understand how a jury could reasonably conclude
that the injury was caused by "accidental means. '47 It would seem
that a frank elimination of the "means/results" distinction would
have little effect on the outcome of cases in New Jersey.48
III. TREND TOWARD ELIMINATION OF THE DISTINCTION
A. Evolution
Over the years since Landress the trend has clearly been to elim-
inate the distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental
results." Courts which have adopted this approach allow recovery
for unintended "results" of the insured's voluntary act, even
though nothing unforeseen or unintended has occurred in the per-
formance of the act. Thus, unexpected "consequences" provide the
"accidental" element, notwithstanding the fact that the policy pro-
vides coverage only against injury arising from "accidental means."
These courts base their decisions upon generally accepted rules of
construction-that an insurance policy should be interpreted most
strongly against the insurer,49 that doubt should be resolved in
favor of the insured whenever there is an ambiguity in the terms of
the policy,50 and that in defining the terms of the policy the courts
should adopt the ordinary meaning of the language. 1
In some states there has been an evolution over a period of
years, with the court first adopting a liberal definition of "acciden-
tal means," and eventually abolishing the distinction between "ac-
cidental means" and "accidental results." A good example of this
can be found in the Arizona cases, beginning with California State
Life Insurance Co. v. Fuqua.52 In Fuqua, the insured had been
killed by police in a gun battle. In affirming the lower court's judg-
ment for the beneficiary on a jury verdict, the court said that the
"test is, what effect should the insured, as a reasonable man, ex-
47. Id. at 526 (Haneman, J., dissenting).
48. See Schwartz v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 233 A.2d 416, 422 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1967), where the court said that this was "the sense of the cases, although not
their language." In Schwartz, the insured was killed when his car went off the road during a
high speed chase by the police. The court said that recovery should be allowed if the injury
was not in fact expected, even though the risk of injury was foreseeable. The court found
that there was a reasonable basis for the insured's belief that injury was not a virtual
certainty.
49. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Evins, 199 So. 2d 238, 241 (Miss. 1967).
50. Ziolkowski v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 N.E.2d 451, 456 (Ill. 1937).
51. Thompson v. Ezzel, 379 P.2d 983, 985 (Wash. 1963).
52. 10 P.2d 958 (Ariz. 1932).
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pect from his own actions under the circumstances."5' A similar
test of foreseeability was applied some years later in Malanga v.
Royal Indemnity Co., where the insured had died from the com-
bined effects of alcohol and barbiturates, neither of which alone
would have been sufficient to have caused death.' In reversing the
lower courts' judgments for the insurer, the court found that there
was
no evidence that the "insured, as a reasonable man," expected or
anticipated or desired the injury which resulted from his volun-
tary acts.... He did not suspect, or know, or have any reason to
know that alcohol and barbiturates, when consumed in the quan-
tities which he took, would produce an injury resulting in death. 5
In both Fuqua and Malanga the court used a definition for "acci-
dental means" based on foreseeability which was essentially
equivalent to an "accidental results" approach.
In Knight v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.," decided only
one year after Malanga, the court acknowledged the position it
had reached and expressly adopted the view of Justice Cardozo's
Landress dissent, "that an accident is an accident whether it be in
the 'means' or the 'result.' ,,57 The court obviously took this posi-
tion so that it might avoid the "Serbonian Bog of semantics and
polemical maze"58 in future cases, because it recognized that the
foreseeability test of Fuqua and Malanga would have justified a
judgment for the beneficiary in Knight even if applied.59
B. Elimination of Distinction
Most of the states which have considered the matter in the last
fifty years have abolished the distinction between "accidental
means" and "accidental results." 0 Some have done so by express
53. Id. at 960.
54. 422 P.2d 704 (Ariz. 1967).
55. Id. at 708. There apparently was no dispute that the insured did not know, or have
reason to know, that consumption of alcohol and barbiturates in the quantities taken would
result in injury or death. Id. at 705-06.
56. 437 P.2d 416 (Ariz. 1968).
57. Id. at 420.
58. Id. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
59. Knight, 437 P.2d at 419. Insured, an experienced diver, was killed when he dove off
Coolidge Dam. He had often dived from great heights and had even dived from this dam
before. He told friends who were with him that he knew he could make it. Just before he hit
the water, he rolled over too far on his back, apparently because he misjudged the distance.
60. See Appendix, infra, for a state-by-state listing.
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statement,"' others only by implication.6 2 In some cases the court's
statement was necessary to the disposition of the case, 3 and in
other cases it was merely dictum. 4 Regardless of how the liberal
view was adopted and announced, it seems very likely that it will
continue to be applied in those states, and may well be adopted in
the future in those states still purporting to follow the strict view,
as well as in those states in which the question does not appear to
have ever been decided. 6
IV. TESTS FOR "ACCIDENTAL RESULT"
Most courts use a foreseeability test in determining whether a
"result" is "accidental."66 Some courts hold that the test is an ob-
jective one: whether the result was a contingency "known to all
sensible men as likely to follow" as a natural result of one's con-
duct;6 7 a contingency which "any [person] with ordinary intelli-
gence and prudence . . . could have reasonably foreseen. 6a8 Other
courts hold that foreseeability is determined by whether injury or
death was foreseeable by either the insured or by a reasonably pru-
61. E.g., Knight v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 437 P.2d 416 (Ariz. 1968); Taylor v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 N.E.2d 5 (11. 1957); Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Hey-
ward, 536 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1976).
62. E.g., Bukata v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 67 P.2d 607 (Kan. 1937); Hoff v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 254 N.W. 137 (Mich. 1934); Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Green, 46 P.2d
372 (Okla. 1935).
63. E.g., Schonberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 104 So. 2d 171 (La. 1958) (death resulted
from shock produced by a very rare reaction to a blood transfusion); Thompson v. American
Cas. Co., 439 P.2d 276 (Utah 1968) (epilepticus allegedly resulted from temporary duty op-
erating a jackhammer in a small, hot space; foreseeability question of fact for jury); Stoffel
v. American Family Life Ins. Co., 164 N.W.2d 484 (Wis. 1969) (heart failure after lifting
heavy wagon off of tractor wheel).
64. E.g., Knight v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 437 P.2d 416 (Ariz. 1968) (see supra note
59 and accompanying text); Griswold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 180 A. 649 (Vt. 1935)
(insured was chopping wood; a stick flew up and cut his lip, which became infected; court
said that, even under strict rule, having the stick hit his face was an accidental means).
65. The authors have not discovered any cases in Hawaii, Maine, South Dakota, or Wyo-
ming (but see Smith v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 614 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1980) (ap-
plying Wyoming law)).
66. Most courts treat the words "accident," "accidental" and "accidental bodily injury"
as being synonymous with "accidental result" and apply the same tests as they use for "ac-
cidental result."
67. Hutton v. States Acc. Ins. Co., 108 N.E. 296, 297 (Ill. 1915).
68. Cory v. Woodmen Acc. Co., 164 N.E. 159, 162 (Ill. 1928). See also International Un-
derwriters, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 1084 (4th Cir. 1981) (reasonable person would
have recognized that death could result from his actions; insured strangled when "fail-safe"
mechanism failed during autoerotic act); Sigler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp.
542 (S.D. Iowa), af/d, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981).
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dent person in the same position."' And some courts embrace a
completely subjective approach, stating that the test is foreseeabil-
ity from the viewpoint of the insured. 0
The majority of courts take the position that injury or death is
not an "accidental result" if it was reasonably foreseeable, and that
it need not have been the inevitable consequence of the insured's
actions. Other courts are much more liberal, however, and allow
recovery if injury was not in fact expected, even though the risk of
injury was foreseeable. 7' And some allow recovery for anything
short of suicide.7
The liberal attitude of many courts in recent years is well illus-
trated by the concurring opinion of Justice Musmanno of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Beckham v. Travelers Insurance
Co.:74
The person who drives his automobile at 100 miles per hour on
a congested highway is, in metamorphical [sic] language, "com-
miting suicide," but if he is killed it does not legally or logically
follow that he actually intended to take his life. Many if not per-
haps most, fatalities of a violent character, (where crime is not
involved) are due to poor reasoning, neglectful conduct, or a reck-
less attitude on the part of the deceased. An insomniac takes too
many sleeping pills because he yearns to erase with a weary arm
the slate of exhaustion, pain or sorrow; the swimmer dives into a
shallow pool, seeking the exhilaration of cooling waters to drown
the fatigue of a tired and weary body; a pedestrian runs across
the street in front of a speeding street car because he sees on the
other side of the thoroughfare a dear friend whose companionship
will be medicine to his loneliness and despair. Where death re-
sults in such cases the result is accidental even though the de-
ceased voluntarily rode the thunderbolt which killed him.
69. E.g., Gulledge v. Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co., 179 S.E.2d 605 (S.C. 1971) (insured
dated married man; she called his wife several times to tell her about it; she drove by wife's
house with another man; wife followed her; when they stopped, wife shot insured and other
man twice, then ran over insured).
70. E.g., Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1976).
71. McCrary v. New York Life Ins. Co., 84 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1936) (insured was in bed
with a married woman; woman's husband entered room and shot insured).
72. Schwartz v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 233 A.2d 416 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1967) (high speed auto chase; court held there was a reasonable basis for insured's belief
that injury was not a virtual certainty).
73. "Having thus determined that the insured did not commit suicide ... it inevitably
follows that his death was accidental." Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1957)
(Drew, J., dissenting in part) (insured was playing Russian Roulette).
74. 225 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1967) (Musmanno, J., concurring) (overdose of narcotics).
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[The insured in this case] wanted to live, if only to dive again
into the shallow pool of artificial exhilaration, if only to cross the
street to embrace the morphine sweetheart of heart's ease. He
used bad judgment, he was reckless, [but] he did not want to
bring bereavement and sadness to his mother, and it is comfort-
ing to know that she will not be denied the money he provided to
help her along the remainder of her lonely journey when he, even
through his own negligence, involuntarily left her."
V. DOES THE Means/Results DISTINCTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
While in some situations recovery of insurance policy proceeds
may not be affected by whether the court distinguishes between
"means" and "results,"7 6 it is clear that in many cases this distinc-
tion will be the decisive factor in determining the outcome of the
case. This is especially true where the insured's own act results in
his death or injury, as opposed to those cases where the act is com-
mitted by another party."
Perhaps the clearest example of the impact of the "means/re-
sults" distinction can be found in cases involving the insured's
overexertion or his overexposure to the elements. If a court has
abolished the distinction between "accidental means" and "acci-
dental results," it is highly probable that recovery will be allowed,
due to the fact that the "result" was almost always unexpected and
unforeseen. 8 Likewise, if the court takes a strict approach to dis-
tinguishing between "accidental means" and "accidental results,"
it should be equally probable that recovery will be denied, because
the insured's "act" was usually just what he intended. Yet courts
75. Id. at 537-38.
76. See, e.g., infra notes 80-81, 85-86 and accompanying text.
77. Id. But see infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Bukata v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 67 P.2d 607 (Kan. 1937) (heat stroke
or heat prostration); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 251 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1952) (ruptured
blood vessels after pushing car in snow); Stoffel v. American Family Life Ins. Co., 164
N.W.2d 484 (Wis. 1969) (heart failure after lifting heavy wagon off of tractor wheel);
O'Connell v. New York Life Ins. Co., 264 N.W. 253 (Wis. 1936) (double pneumonia following
heat prostration).
79. See, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1934) (sunstroke
while playing golf); Rock v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 156 P. 1029 (Cal. 1916) (heart failure from
overexertion in carrying heavy casket down stairs); Smith v. Continental Cas. Co., 203 A.2d
168 (D.C. 1964) (heart attack after exertion in climbing embankment in performance of
regular duties as engineer); Husbands v. Indiana Travelers' Acc. Ass'n, 133 N.E. 130 (Ind.
1921) (ruptured blood vessel due to exertion in shaking down ashes in furnace); Miller v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 331 P.2d 310 (Kan. 1958) (heart attack while doing heavy
work as oil field roughneck); Reeves v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130 N.E.2d 541
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purporting to distinguish between "means" and "results" have
often shown an astonishing willingness to find that something un-
foreseen or unexpected took place in the act which caused the in-
jury, so that the "means" of injury was "accidental."80 It is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to distinguish these cases from those in
which the court says that no distinction between "means" and "re-
sults" should be recognized, yet finds in the given case that the
means was accidental anyway. 1
A similar range of views is found in the decisions of cases involv-
ing overconsumption of alcohol and drugs. Courts which distin-
guish between "means" and "results" deny recovery where only the
"result" is accidental,82 while those which have abolished the dis-
(Mass. 1955) (hernia caused by heavy lifting); Kluge v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees, 149
N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1967) (heart attack after lifting and moving railroad handcar); Hender-
son v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 150 S.E.2d 17 (N.C. 1966) (fireman died of smoke inhala-
tion after fighting fire); Johnson v. Business Men's Assur. Co. of America, 228 P.2d 760
(Wash. 1951) (insured died after six to eight trips into burning house to salvage belongings);
Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 174 P.2d 961 (Wash. 1946) (heart attack from effort of
pushing car up slight grade on hill).
80. Wiecking v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 90 (7th Cir. 1940) (applying Indi-
ana law) (sunstroke while playing golf; court said sunstroke could be accidental means in
Indiana, but did not say what unusual or unexpected thing produced the injury); Ashley v.
Agricultural Life Ins. Co. of America, 217 N.W. 27 (Mich. 1928) (insured got lost on hunting
trip and froze to death; means of death was unintended exposure to storm and frost); Wills
v. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 91 P.2d 695 (Mont. 1939) (insured got off street car at wrong
stop in minus-40-degree weather; court said exposure and freezing were unintentional);
Dalbey v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 74 P.2d 432 (Mont. 1937) (fireman inhaled smoke
while manning hose outside burning barn; court said smoke inhalation to such an extreme
extent was not expected); Hammer v. Mutual Beneficial Health & Acc. Ass'n, 109 N.E.2d
649 (Ohio 1952) (insured, a roofer, died from sunstroke and heat exhaustion; court said
means was not the act of working in the sun, but rather the action of the heat and rays of
the sun). Compare King v. Travelers Ins. Co., 192 A. 311 (Conn. 1937) (injury from dentist's
overexposure to x-ray; court said he intended exposure to x-ray, but did not intend overex-
posure) with Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2 N.W.2d 576 (Neb. 1942) (dentist got cancer
after using finger to hold x-ray film for many years; court held that cumulative effect of x-
ray exposure was unexpected, and no distinction should be made between accidental means
and accidental results; the dissent questioned if even the result was accidental, because it
"was all but sure to follow," id. at 582 (Tewell, J., dissenting)).
81. Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America, 67 N.E.2d 248 (N.Y.
1946) (insured caught in snow storm; fell and hit head); Wall v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co.,
274 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1979) (hurt back while loading bags of seed on farm; no specific lift
caused the injury); Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Green, 46 P.2d 372 (Okla. 1935) (sun-
stroke while working on railroad); Goethe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 190 S.E. 451 (S.C.
1937) (heat stroke from intense heat while fighting unexpected grass fire on farm).
82. Hargreaves v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 163 Cal. Rptr. 857 (Ct. App. 1980) (heroin
overdose by six-year drug user); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Gutowski, 113 A.2d 579
(Del. 1955) (overdose of barbiturates; insured had taken more than prescribed number of
capsules previously); Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338 (Md. 1970) (death
caused by hypersensitivity to heroin, or impurities in the heroin, or synergism); McGinley v.
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tinction allow recovery so long as the "result" was unexpected and
unforeseen."s Here also, recovery is frequently allowed by courts
still purporting to distinguish between "means" and "results," by
using a liberal test for "accidental means,"84 on facts which are
very similar to those where other courts have found that only the
"result" was "accidental."8 5 Where recovery is allowed for "acci-
dental results," it appears that injury or death must be highly
foreseeable before recovery will be denied.86
Much the same spectrum of results is found in cases involving
the insured's participation in a reckless or foolhardy act;87 his vol-
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 184 A. 593 (N.H. 1936) (acute alcohol poisoning after
consuming unknown quantity of alcohol); Whiteside v. New York Life Ins. Co., 503 P.2d
1107 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (self-injected overdose of morphine and methedrine; long his-
tory of drug use).
83. O'roole v. New York Life Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Louisiana
law) (overdose of cocaine); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States v. Hemenover,
67 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1937) (overdose of luminal, taken for sleeplessness); Russell v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 439 N.E.2d 89 (II. App. Ct. 1982) (overconsumption of vodka); Marsh v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 388 N.E.2d 1121 (11. App. Ct. 1979) (overdose by drug addict);
Catania v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 631 (Nev. 1979) (insured regurgitated and
choked to death as a result of acute narcosis caused by self-administered heroin injection);
Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 225 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1967) (drug overdose).
84. Commercial Ins. Co. v. Orr, 379 F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1967) (applying Missouri law)
(aspiration of vomitus by alcoholic after drinking; court said jury could find cause of death
was failure of epiglottis to close air passage; this was unintended); Pilcher v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Ct. App. 1972) (drug overdose by regular user; court said unin-
tended overdose is accidental means, because death was unintended and unexpected).
85. Spence v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 69 P.2d 713 (Kan. 1937) (overdose of barbital
by drug addict; jury found that insured did not know that amount he took was likely to
cause death); Collins v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 194 (Mich. 1980) (acute alco-
hol intoxication; jury question whether death was foreseen by insured).
86. Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 24 D.L.R.3d 683 (County Ct. of Grey, Onta-
rio 1971) (insured put head in plastic bag and inhaled Cutex fumes during autoerotic experi-
ence; court said he knew or should have known that death might ensue, so death was not an
accident).
87. Court distinguished between "accidental means" and "accidental results": American
Cas. Co. v. Hyder, 8 Life Cas. (CCH) 947 (Tenn. 1943) (insured poured gasoline on his
privates to cleanse himself after leaving a house of prostitution; he then struck a match so
he could see better, and was burned; recovery denied; only the result was accidental);
Nicholas v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970) (insured
allegedly playing Russian Roulette; recovery denied; court held that, as a reasonable man,
insured foresaw or should have foreseen that death or injury might result). But see Linder v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 250 S.E.2d 662 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 254 S.E.2d 918
(N.C. 1979) (insured playing Russian Roulette; reversed and remanded for new trial; jury
could find that insured did not intend to pull trigger, and that gun discharged accidentally).
Court did not distinguish between "accidental means" and "accidental results": Knight v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 437 P.2d 416 (Ariz. 1968) (insured, an experienced diver, dove off
a high dam from which he had dived before; recovery allowed; court found that both means
and results were accidental); Taylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 N.E.2d 5 (11.
1957) (insured and others spread gasoline in house they intended to burn; pilot light in
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untary submission to a medical or dental procedure; 8 infection or
disease entering the body through a cut or ingestion of food or
drink; 9 participation in an autoerotic experience;90 and a variety of
stove ignited gasoline, and insured was trapped in house; recovery allowed; injury was not
foreseeable). Compare two Russian Roulette cases: Koger v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 163
S.E.2d 672 (W. Va. 1968) (recovery denied; exposure to a known and obvious danger is not
accidental) with Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Nash, 97 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1957) (recovery allowed; it
having been found that insured did not intend to commit suicide, "it inevitably follows that
his death was accidental," id. at 8 (Drew, J., dissenting in part)).
Many courts allowing recovery have pointed out that the insurer may avoid coverage in
these cases by including in the policy a provision which excludes from coverage injury or
death caused by exposure to obvious risk of injury or obvious danger. See, e.g., Rodgers v.
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 132 N.E.2d 692, 696-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956).
88. Court distinguished between "accidental means" and "accidental results": New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Bruner, 153 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1958) (unusual reaction to spinal
anesthetic; recovery denied); Wheeler v. Title Guar. & Cas. Co., 251 N.W. 408 (Mich. 1933)
(reaction to injection of nupercaine, a common anesthetic; recovery allowed; effect was not
the natural and probable consequence of the means); Caldwell v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 267
S.W. 907 (Mo. 1924) (bowel obstruction following hernia operation which had been skillfully
performed; recovery denied); International Travelers' Ass'n v. Francis, 23 S.W.2d 282 (Tex.
1930) (infection followed extraction of tooth; recovery allowed). In neither Wheeler nor
Francis did the court indicate what made the means accidental.
Court did not distinguish between "accidental means" and "accidental results": INA Life
Ins. Co. v. Brundin, 533 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1975) (heart stopped during hemorrhoid surgery;
recovery allowed if jury finds that death was caused by the surgery); Gaskins v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 104 So. 2d 171 (La. 1958) (death from shock produced by a very rare reaction
to a blood transfusion; recovery allowed); Cooper v. New York Ins. Co., 180 P.2d 654 (Okla.
1947) (unusual reaction to morphine which had been given to relieve pain; recovery al-
lowed); Zinn v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 107 P.2d 921 (Wash. 1940) (infection developed after
doctor lanced insured's arm to relieve high blood pressure; recovery allowed).
89. Court distinguished between "accidental means" and "accidental results": Northam
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 163 So. 635 (Ala. 1935) (insured pulled a hair out of his face
with tweezers; infection developed because tweezers were not sterile; recovery denied);
Christ v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 144 N.E. 161 (Ill. 1924) (insured got typhoid after drink-
ing polluted water; recovery allowed; court said insured intended to drink pure water, not
polluted water); Kimball v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 117 A. 228 (R.I. 1922) (insured physi-
cian contracted erysipelas from patient; bacteria entered his body through open boil on his
neck; recovery denied).
Court did not distinguish between "accidental means" and "accidental results": Griswold
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 180 A. 649 (Vt. 1935) (while insured was chopping wood, a
stick flew up and cut his lip, which became infected; recovery allowed; court noted that the
stick hitting his face was an accidental means anyway).
90. In these cases, the insured has often used a noose and pulley (or some other device)
to reduce or temporarily cut off the supply of oxygen to the brain, with the expectation that
this would heighten the erotic experience of masturbation. When something went wrong and
the fail-safe mechanism did not work, the insured ended up strangling himself.
All of the cases which the authors have discovered involved coverage for "accidental bod-
ily injury," which is usually equated with accidental results. In only one case, Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Tommie, 619 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981), was recovery allowed.
The court affirmed a judgment on a jury verdict for the beneficiary, saying that death was
accidental unless the insured acted in such a way that he should have reasonably known
that his actions would probably result in his death. Courts which have denied recovery in
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other activities.91
VI. CASES WHERE INJURY OR DEATH IS CAUSED BY THE ACT OF
ANOTHER
It seems to make much less difference whether a court distin-
guishes between "accidental means" and "accidental results" when
the death or injury was caused by the act of another person. In
these cases the courts usually apply a foreseeability test, where the
issue is whether the insured's death or injury was a natural and
probable consequence of his actions.2 Courts which do not distin-
guish between "means" and "results" seem to be just as willing to
find that injury or death was foreseeable"' as are those courts
these cases have applied the same test, but have found that the insured knew or should have
known that death could result from his actions. International Underwriters, Inc. v. Home
Ins. Co., 662 F.2d 1084 (4th Cir. 1981); Sigler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp.
542 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981).
91. Court distinguished between "accidental means" and "accidental results": Chelly v.
Home Ins. Co., 285 A.2d 810 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 293 A.2d 295 (Del. 1972) (insured
suffered slipped disc while bowling; recovery denied); Smith v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 106 N.E.
607 (Mass. 1914) (insured sniffed too hard while using nasal douche; this carried germs into
the middle ear, and eventually to the brain, causing spinal meningitis; recovery denied);
New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 110 N.E. 475 (Ohio 1914) (heart attack followed shock
from taking cold bath after horseback riding; recovery denied); Newsoms v. Commercial
Cas. Ins. Co., 137 S.E. 456 (Va. 1927) (ptomaine poisoning or acute indigestion after eating
canned beans; recovery allowed; court said he intended to eat nourishing food, but instead
ate tainted food).
Court did not distinguish between "accidental means" and "accidental results": Miser v.
Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 273 N.W. 155 (Iowa 1937) (insured bled to death after
cutting his wrist when he struck a window; it was not clear whether he struck the window on
purpose or not; recovery allowed); Ray v. Federated Guar. Life Ins. Co., 381 So. 2d 847 (La.
Ct. App. 1980) (insured was in mental hospital, and thought he had supernatural powers; he
drowned after placing himself facedown in a partially filled bathtub; recovery allowed);
Wiger v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 236 N.W. 534 (Wis. 1931) (carbon monoxide poisoning while
insured was in an enclosed garage with car motor running; recovery allowed, because jury
found death was not suicide).
92. Freed v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 405 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 551 F.2d
861 (5th Cir. 1977) (insured was aggressor; recovery denied). Some courts use a more subjec-
tive standard: whether the insured actually expected what occurred, and persisted in his
aggressions regardless. Freeman v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 286 N.E.2d 396 (Ind. 1972).
93. McCrary v. New York Life Ins. Co., 84 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1936) (insured in bed with
married woman; woman's husband entered and shot insured; death was reasonably foresee-
able, even if not the inevitable consequence). The same is true where the coverage is for
"accidental bodily injury," which is usually treated as the equivalent of "accidental result."
Byrd v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 415 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1980) (insured was wounded by police
gunfire after he shot first at police; recovery denied); Carlyle v. Equity Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
551 P.2d 663 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (armed robbery of small store at night; insured left store;
attendant followed and yelled at him to stop; insured turned with gun in hand, and was
shot; recovery denied). Recovery is also sometimes barred by a "violation of law" exclusion
in the policy, McCrary, 84 F.2d at 790; or because the court feels that recovery should be
1984]
18 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1
which still recognize the distinction.94 On the other hand, recovery
has been allowed by courts which distinguish between "means"
and "results" upon a finding that injury was not foreseeable,9" just
as it would be by courts which have abolished the distinction,96 or
by courts which do not even discuss the "means/results"
distinction.97
While the same foreseeability test is usually applied when the
insured is injured or killed by his wife after abusing or beating her,
it appears that the courts will make every effort to allow recovery,
because in most cases the result of finding that injury was foresee-
able is to make the wife a two-time loser-the victim of her hus-
band's abuse, and a nonbeneficiary of the insurance proceeds. In
fact, in only one of the many cases which the authors have read
has recovery been denied to the widow-beneficiary, and this was
probably due to a strict application of the distinction between
"means" and "results."9 8 Usually the court will find that death was
denied on grounds of public policy because the insured's injury was a direct result of his
own criminal conduct. Piotrowski v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 252 N.Y.S. 313, 318
(App. Div. 1931).
94. Walker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (insured
prowled around ex-wife's house at night, and attempted forcible entry; she warned him that
she would get a gun, then shot him); National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 86 S.W.2d 139
(Ky. 1935) (insured was aggressor and other person shot in self-defense); Kentucky Cent.
Life Ins. Co. v. Willett, 557 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (insured and girlfriend had
argument in car; he slapped her and waved a gun at her; she picked up the gun, they strug-
gled, and gun went off, killing insured); Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Partain, 106 A.2d
79 (Md. 1954) (insured was aggressor; reversed and remanded on other grounds); Smith v.
Combined Ins. Co. of America, 120 S.E.2d 267 (Va. 1961) (insured was a fugitive; he hid in a
barn and shot at the police; tear gas shot into barn set it on fire, and he burned to death).
95. California State Life Ins. Co. v. Fuqua, 10 P.2d 958 (Ariz. 1932) (insured was shot by
police during gun battle); Freeman v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 286 N.E.2d 396 (Ind.
1972) (alleged aggressor killed by victim; summary judgment for insurer reversed and re-
manded for trial).
96. Crumpton v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying
Texas law) (insured allegedly raped a neighbor, and threatened to kill her children if she
told anyone; she reported this to police five days later; on the following evening, she saw
insured on street; he came toward her, she pulled out a gun, and shot him; jury could find
woman's actions to be unanticipated); Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Stephens, 49 S.W.2d
364 (Ark. 1932) (insured came to aid of friend who was in a fight; insured was cut with a
knife); Gulledge v. Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co., 179 S.E.2d 605 (S.C. 1971) (insured dated a
married man; she called his wife several times to tell her about it; insured drove by the
wife's house with another man; wife followed them in her car; when they stopped, wife shot
both twice, then ran over insured).
97. Smith v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 614 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying Wyo-
ming law) (insured was shot during a property line dispute); Terry v. National Farmers
Union Life Ins. Co., 356 P.2d 975 (Mont. 1960) (death resulted from fist fight during card
game).
98. Butcher v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 290 S.E.2d 373 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (insured
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not sufficiently foreseeable to bar recovery,9 especially if a jury has
given its verdict for the beneficiary. 100
VII. CONCLUSION
There seems to be little question that there is a strong trend in
favor of liberal construction of the term "accidental means,"
thereby enhancing the chances of recovery by the beneficiary.
Whether by creatively searching for something unusual or unfore-
seen in the act itself, or by simply equating "means" and "results,"
most courts have attempted to arrive at decisions which reflect the
reasonable understanding and expectations of laypersons in the
purchase of accident policies. While there will probably continue to
be some resistance to this trend, it seems likely to remain the dom-
inant view in the years ahead.
started fight with wife and got a butcher knife; he was wounded in a struggle over the knife;
court held that the insured was the aggressor and provoked his wife's act; while the "result"
may have been accidental, the "means" was not).
99. Cockrell v. Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Arkansas law) (in-
sured hit his wife, threatened her and her children, and left the house; when he returned,
she shot him); Stogsdill v. General American Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976) (insured shot by wife; evidence was unclear as to whether he was the aggressor); Floyd
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 264 S.E.2d 648 (W. Va. 1980) (insured, a large man, regularly
got drunk and beat up his wife, a small woman; she had previously always been passive, but
this time she stabbed him).
100. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 130 So. 2d 178 (Ala. 1961) (insured often beat up his
wife in presence of son; while drunk, he beat her up and threatened to kill them both; son,
who had never physically resisted before, shot him; court said it could not say as a matter of
law that the natural and probable consequence of insured's actions was that son would kill
him).
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APPENDIX
The authors have attempted to determine each American jurisdiction's
definition of "accidental means," and whether it distinguishes between
"accidental means" and "accidental results." In many instances, the
state's position is definite and clear. In others, it is not at all certain, for a
variety of reasons. The court's answers to the question may only be
implied or dictum; the latest case may be quite old; the court may
purport to follow one rule but actually apply another; or there may be no
decision on point in the state at all.
In light of this, we have not attempted to list in two columns the states
which follow each of the rules. Such specificity is neither possible nor
prudent. Rather we have simply given our analysis of the case or cases in
each state and indicated our view as to how that state should be
categorized.
For the sake of brevity, in this Appendix we will refer to the distinction
between "accidental means" and "accidental results" as "the distinction."
Alabama:
Has consistently made the distinction. Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. Beasley, 130 So. 2d 178 (Ala. 1961); Emergency Aid Insur-
ance Co. v. Dobbs, 83 So. 2d 335 (Ala. 1955); Northam v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co., 163 So. 635 (Ala. 1935); National Se-
curity Insurance Co. v. Ingalls, 323 So. 2d 384 (Ala. Civ. App.
1975).
Alaska:
Does not recognize the distinction. INA Life Insurance Co. v.
Brundin, 533 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1975).
Arizona:
Expressly abolished the distinction, although the court's state-
ment was dictum because the court found that the means was
accidental. Knight v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 437 P.2d
416 (Ariz. 1968).
Arkansas:
Stated that "accident" and "accidental means" are synony-
mous, though this was probably dictum, because the insured came
to the aid of a friend in a fight, and his being cut may have been
accidental or, if done on purpose, was not foreseeable to the in-
sured. Travelers' Protective Association of America v. Stephens,
49 S.W.2d 364 (Ark. 1932). See also Cockrell v. Life Insurance
Co., 692 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Arkansas law)
(dictum).
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California:
Has consistently made the distinction. Ells v. Order of United
Commercial Travelers of America, 125 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1942); Rock
v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 156 P. 1029 (Cal. 1916); Hargreaves
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 163 Cal. Rptr. 857 (Ct. App.
1980); Dark v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 40 P.2d 906
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
Colorado:
Has eliminated the distinction. Reed v. United States Fidelity
& Guarantee Co., 491 P.2d 1377 (Colo. 1971); Equitable Life As-
surance Society of the United States v. Hemenover, 67 P.2d 80
(Colo. 1937).
Connecticut:
Still recognizes the distinction, but is liberal in its construction
of "accidental means." King v. Travelers Insurance Co., 192 A.
311 (Conn. 1937) (recovery allowed for dentist's injury from over-
exposure to x-ray; saying he intended exposure, but not overexpo-
sure); Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 225 A.2d 498
(Conn. C.P. 1966) (death resulting from high speed auto chase).
Delaware:
Recognizes the distinction. Chelly v. Home Insurance Co., 293
A.2d 295 (Del. 1972), aff'g 285 A.2d 810 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971);
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Gutowski, 113 A.2d 579
(Del. 1955).
District of Columbia:
Made the distinction in Smith v. Continental Casualty Co., 203
A.2d 168 (D.C. 1964). But see discussion in the Kansas cases
infra.
Florida:
Abolished the distinction in Gulf Life Insurance Co. v. Nash,
97 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1957). But see Benante v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 477 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Florida law), where
the court denied recovery for death following a heart attack after
the exertion of running to catch a plane. In Benante, the court
followed Goldstein v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co., 164 So. 2d
576 (Fla. 3d DCA) cert. denied, 170 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1964), involv-
ing the same issue, i.e., a voluntary act with an unexpected result.
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Georgia:
Stated that it made the distinction, but did so in a case in
which the beneficiary might have lost anyway because of failure
to carry the burden of proof. Continental Assurance Co. v.
Rothell, 181 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 1971) (insured, who was drunk, pick-
ed up by police; insured found to have suffered a broken neck;
there was no other evidence).
Hawaii:
There do not appear to be any cases on point.
Idaho:
Does not recognize the distinction. O'Neil v. New York Life In-
surance Co., 152 P.2d 707 (Idaho 1944); Rauert v. Loyal Protec-
tive Insurance Co., 106 P.2d 1015 (Idaho 1940).
Illinois:
Expressly abolished the distinction in Taylor v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 142 N.E.2d 5 (Ill. 1957), after im-
pliedly eliminating it in previous cases. Though the Taylor court
divided four-three on the decision, the disagreement was as to
whether the "result" of the insured's actions was "accidental." All
members of the court treated "accidental means" as synonymous
with "accidental results."
Indiana:
Has recognized the distinction since Husbands v. Indiana
Travelers' Accident Association, 133 N.E. 130 (Ind. 1921) and
impliedly reaffirmed this position in Freeman v. Commonwealth
Life Insurance Co., 286 N.E.2d 396 (Ind. 1972). However, in Free-
man the insured was allegedly the aggressor in the encounter in
which he was killed. The court stated that death was by acciden-
tal means unless the insured actually expected such a result and
persisted in his aggression anyway. Such a subjective test would
be considered liberal even for a court which has abolished the
distinction.
Iowa:
Has eliminated the distinction. Comfort v. Continental Casu-
alty Co., 34 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1948); Miser v. Iowa State Travel-
ing Men's Association, 273 N.W. 155 (Iowa 1937).
Kansas:
Refused to make the distinction in Spence v. Equitable Life
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Assurance Society, 69 P.2d 713 (Kan. 1937) and Bukata v. Met-
ropolitan Life Insurance Co., 67 P.2d 607 (Kan. 1937), but did
make the distinction in Miller v. Prudential Insurance Co. of
America, 331 P.2d 310 (Kan. 1958). The insured in Miller suf-
fered a heart attack while doing heavy work as an oil field rough-
neck. The court denied recovery, holding that this was an acci-
dental result. It may be that Kansas, and perhaps other
jurisdictions, make an exception in cases involving overexertion in
an ordinary, regular activity. See, e.g., Benante v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co., 477 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Florida law)
(heart attack after running to catch plane); Smith v. Continental
Casualty Co., 203 A.2d 168 (D.C. 1964) (heart attack after climb-
ing embankment in performance of regula duties as engineer).
Kentucky:
Makes the distinction. National Life & Accident Insurance Co.
v. Jones, 86 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1935); Kentucky Central Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Willett, 557 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
Louisiana:
Has repudiated the distinction. Schonberg v. New York Life
Insurance Co., 104 So. 2d 171 (La. 1958); Ray v. Federated Guar-
anty Life Insurance Co., 381 So. 2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
Maine:
There do not appear to be any cases on point.
Maryland:
Makes the distinction. Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 260 A.2d 338 (Md. 1970); Home Beneficial Life Insurance
Co. v. Partain, 106 A.2d 79 (Md. 1954).
Massachusetts:
Makes the distinction. Reeves v. John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co., 130 N.E.2d 541 (Mass. 1955); Smith v. Travelers'
Insurance Co., 106 N.E. 607 (Mass. 1914).
Michigan:
Impliedly eliminated the distinction by allowing recovery in
Wheeler v. Title Guaranty & Casualty Co., 251 N.W. 408 (Mich.
1933) (death following injection of nupercaine, a common anes-
thetic) and Hoff v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 254 N.W. 137
(Mich. 1934) (abrasion, caused by being left on a bedpan too long,
became infected). However, in Turner v. Mutual Benefit Health
& Accident Association, 24 N.W.2d 534 (Mich. 1946), where the
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insured jumped to get on a moving freight elevator, missed, and
fell down the shaft, the court said that United States Mutual Ac-
cident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100 (1889) was "squarely in
point." Barry, of course, was the early landmark case which es-
tablished the distinction. The Turner court could have found that
the insured intended to jump on the elevator, and instead jumped
down the shaft, and thus the "means" was "accidental." But the
court also said that Wheeler and Hoff were "[o]f like import." It
is hard to see how the court could find that Barry, Wheeler and
Hoff stand for the same view. Quite recently, in Collins v. Nation-
wide Life Insurance Co., 294 N.W.2d 194 (Mich. 1980), the court
reversed a judgment for the insurer in a case that seemed to in-
volve only an "accidental result," although the court stated that it
need not decide if Michigan distinguishes between "accidental
means" and "accidental results." In Collins, death resulted from
acute alcoholic intoxication. The Michigan court held that the
jury must decide whether death was in fact foreseen-whether
the insured intended or expected his conduct to result in death.
This is clearly a very liberal "accidental result" approach, even if
the Michigan court is reluctant to say so.
Minnesota:
Makes the distinction. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v.
Erickson, 42 F.2d 997 (8th Cir. 1930) (applying Minnesota law);
Kluge v. Benefit Association of Railway Employees, 149 N.W.2d
681 (Minn. 1967) (policy covered "accidental bodily injury," but
court treated this as being the same as "accidental means").
Mississippi:
The court stated that there is a distinction between "accidental
means" and "accidental results" in Lavender v. Volunteer State
Life Insurance Co., 157 So. 101 (Miss. 1934), but this was dictum.
The distinction was not at issue, because the insured's body had
no visible contusion or wound as required by the policy, and also,
the insured was violating the law (a policy exclusion) by attacking
a constable.
Missouri:
Has consistently made the distinction, but sometimes applies
the test rather liberally. Commercial Insurance Co. v. Orr, 379
F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1967) (applying Missouri law) (aspiration of
vomitus by alcoholic after drinking; recovery allowed; court said
jury could find that cause of death was failure of epiglottis to
close air passage, which was unexpected); New Empire Life In-
surance Co. v. Bowling, 411 S.W.2d 863 (Ark. 1967) (applying
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Missouri law) (insured lost control of car at high speed; recovery
allowed; court said loss of control of car was accidental, not inten-
tional); Callahan v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 207
S.W.2d 279 (Mo. 1947) (insured, while drunk, went off the road in
his car; his feet got wet and froze; court held it was a jury ques-
tion whether this was "accidental means"); Caldwell v. Travelers'
Insurance Co., 267 S.W. 907 (Mo. 1924) (insured died of bowel
obstruction after a skillfully performed hernia operation; recovery
denied).
Montana:
Recognized the distinction in dictum in Tuttle v. Pacific Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co., 190 P. 993 (Mont. 1920), and restated it
while allowing recovery through a liberal application of the "acci-
dental means" test in Dalbey v. Equitable Life Assurance Soci-
ety, 74 P.2d 432 (Mont. 1937) (fireman suffered smoke inhalation
while manning hose outside burning barn; court said smoke in-
halation was not expected) and in Wills v. Midland National Life
Insurance Co., 91 P.2d 695 (Mont. 1939) (insured suffered expo-
sure and freezing after he got off street car at wrong stop in mi-
nus-forty-degre weather; court said exposure was accidental). In
its most recent look at the subject, the Montana court did not
discuss the distinction but did say that "an accidental result may
follow an intentional act and be regarded as caused by accidental
means." Terry v. National Farmers Union Life Insurance Co.,
356 P.2d 975, 978 (Mont. 1960) (recovery allowed; death resulted
from a fist fight during a card game).
Nebraska:
Eliminated the distinction in Murphy v. Travelers Insurance
Co., 2 N.W.2d 576 (Neb. 1942) (recovery allowed; dentist got can-
cer after using his finger to hold x-ray film for many years).
Nevada:
Eliminated the distinction in Catania v. State Farm Life In-
surance Co., 598 P.2d 631 (Nev. 1979) (insured regurgitated and
choked to death as a result of acute narcotism caused by self-
administered heroin injection; summary judgment for insurer re-
versed and remanded for trial; although this was a three-two deci-
sion, only one of the dissenters wanted to make the distinction;
the other disagreed only as to the foreseeability of the resulting
death).
New Hampshire:
Made the distinction in McGinley v. John Hancocu Mutual
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Life Insurance Co., 184 A. 593 (N.H. 1936) (insured died of acute
alcoholism after consuming an unknown quantity of alcohol; court
said act was done knowingly, without mistake).
New Jersey:
Recognizes the distinction, but uses a very liberal test based on
the "reasonable expectations of the average policyholder." Per-
rine v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 265 A.2d 521, 524
(N.J. 1970). In Perrine, peritonitis developed following a break in
the intestine caused by pressure on the abdomen while insured
was moving heavy equipment. The court said there was a trau-
matic incident, and a jury could find that the result was caused
by something accidental. As the dissent pointed out, it is difficult
to see how a jury could reasonably conclude that the injury was
caused by "accidental means." As a practical matter, there is no
difference between New Jersey's "reasonable expectations" test
and an elimination of the distinction.
New Mexico:
Does not recognize the distinction. Vallejos v. Colonial Life &
Accident Insurance Co., 571 P.2d 404 (N.M. 1977); Scott v. New
Empire Insurance Co., 400 P.2d 953 (N.M. 1965).
New York:
Does not recognize the distinction. Miller v. Continental Insur-
ance Co., 389 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1976); Burr v. Commercial Travelers
Mutual Accident Association of America, 67 N.E.2d 248 (N.Y.
1946) (dictum).
North Carolina:
Appeared to eliminate the distinction in King v. Commercial
Casualty Insurance Co., 150 S.E. 19 (N.C. 1929) (infection was
caused either by a sprain or by a surgical incision; recovery al-
lowed; court said even if infection was caused by incision, it was
not a natural and probable result of insured's act); but clearly
applied the distinction in Henderson v. Hartford Accident & In-
demnity Co., 150 S.E.2d 17 (N.C. 1966) (fireman died of heart
attack brought on by smoke inhalation after fighting fire; recovery
denied; court said only the result was accidental). The distinction
has been recognized recently in Butcher v. Nationwide Life In-
surance Co., 290 S.E.2d 373 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982), and Linder v.
Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 250 S.E.2d 662 (N.C. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 254 S.E.2d 918 (N.C. 1979).
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North Dakota:
Expressly abolished the distinction in Wall v. Pennsylvania
Life Insurance Co., 274 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1979), and restated
this position in dictum in Kasper v. Provident Life Insurance
Co., 285 N.W.2d 548 (N.D. 1979).
Ohio:
Recognized the distinction in New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v.
Johnson, 110 N.E. 475 (Ohio 1914) (insured suffered heart attack
due to shock from taking cold bath after horseback riding; recov-
ery denied). In Hammer v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident
Association, 109 N.E.2d 649 (Ohio 1952), recovery was allowed
where the insured, a roofer, died from sunstroke and heat exhaus-
tion. The court, without directly discussing the distinction, said
that the means was not the act of working in the sun, but rather
the action of the heat and rays of the sun. This liberal approach
was followed by the Kansas Supreme Court in Rankin v. United
Commercial Travelers of America, 392 P.2d 894 (Kan. 1964),
where, applying Ohio law, judgment for the insurer was reversed
and remanded.. In Rankin, the previously healthy insured died
from a heart attack caused by emotional strain, heat and exertion
while fighting a pasture fire. The Kansas court acknowledged that
Ohio law is unclear regarding the distinction, but felt that Ham-
mer was sufficient precedent for its decision.
Oklahoma:
Does not recognize the distinction. New York Life Insurance
Co. v. Wise, 251 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1952); Cooper v. New York Life
Insurance Co., 180 P.2d 654 (Okla. 1947); Provident Life & Acci-
dent Insurance Co. v. Green, 46 P.2d 372 (Okla. 1935).
Oregon:
Expressly abolished the distinction in Botts v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indemnity Co., 585 P.2d 657 (Or. 1978), though it was
dictum because the policy did not contain an "accidental means"
requirement. Nevertheless, the court seemed to apply the "acci-
dental means" test in denying recovery. The insured, an inexperi-
enced operator of a grader on a highway repair crew, was working
quickly and under great pressure. The exertion and mental strain
caused a heart attack. The court said there was nothing abnormal
or unusual about the activity which led up to the heart attack,
and affirmed the judgment for the insurer. Yet, in Harbeintner v.
Crown Life Insurance Co., 612 P.2d 334 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), the
court cited Botts in affirming a summary judgment for the benefi-
ciary, whose insured had gone off the road while drunk. The court
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said that, "[w]hile drunken driving is dangerous . . ., the public
still regards such an accident [sic!] as 'accidental.'" 612 P.2d at
335 (quoting 1A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 83, §
467 (1979)).
Pennsylvania:
Expressly abandoned the distinction in Beckham v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 225 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1967).
Rhode Island:
Recognized the distinction in Kimball v. Massachusetts Acci-
dent Co., 117 A. 228 (R.I. 1922). There do not appear to be any
more recent cases on point in Rhode Island.
South Carolina:
Eliminated the distinction in Goethe v. New York Life Insur-
ance Co., 190 S.E. 451 (S.C. 1937), though the court's statement
that it was in accord with Justice Cardozo's Landress dissent was
probably dictum. Id. at 456. In Goethe, the insured suffered a
heat stroke while fighting an unexpected grass fire on his farm.
The court found that the heat stroke itself was an "accidental
means," but even if it were not the death was still an "accidental
result."
South Dakota:
There do not appear to be any cases on point.
Tennessee:
Makes the distinction. Baker v. National Life & Accident In-
surance Co., 298 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. 1956); American Casualty
Co. v. Hyder, 8 Life Cas. (CCH) 947 (Tenn. 1943); Nicholas v.
Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., 457 S.W.2d 536 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1970).
Texas:
Expressly eliminated the distinction in Republic National Life
Insurance Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1976). The court
said that the Texas view on accidental death had become so lib-
eral that any distinction between "means" and "results" had dis-
appeared and should no longer be recognized. The test should be
foreseeability from the viewpoint of the insured.
Utah:
Does not recognize the distinction. Thompson v. American
Casualty Co., 439 P.2d 276 (Utah 1968); Carter v. Standard Acci-
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dent Insurance Co., 238 P. 259 (Utah 1925).
Vermont:
Eliminated the distinction in Griswold v. Metropolitan Life In-
surance Co., 180 A. 649 (Vt. 1935), though it was dictum in that
case. While the insured was chopping wood, a stick flew up and
cut his lip, which became infected. The court said that even if the
distinction were made, having the stick hit his face was an "acci-
dental means."
Virginia:
Recognizes the distinction. Runge v. Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co., 537 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying Virginia law);
Smith v. Combined Insurance Co., 120 S.E.2d 267 (Va. 1961)
(dictum, because court held that insured's death was not an acci-
dent); Newsoms v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 137 S.E.
456 (Va. 1927) (dictum, because court found that means was
accidental).
Washington:
Appeared to clearly abandon the distinction in Zinn v. Equita-
ble Life Insurance Co., 107 P.2d 921 (Wash. 1940) (doctor lanced
insured's arm to relieve high blood pressure; an infection devel-
oped; recovery allowed). After citing many cases on both sides of
the distinction conflict, the court said that the cases eliminating
the distinction rested upon "sound legal principles." Id. at 923.
But in Evans v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 174 P.2d 961
(Wash. 1946), the Washington court emphatically stated that "ac-
cidental means" requires that something unforeseen must happen
which produces the injury. Id. at 976. The court expressly over-
ruled two prior cases where recovery was allowed for an "acciden-
tal result," and said that in Zinn and several other cases the
means was "accidental" if a liberal definition was used. (The "ac-
cidental means" in Zinn was not the incision, but rather the entry
of the germs.) While the court's statement in Evans may have
been dictum, because the decision of the case seerned to rest on a
"contributed to by disease" exclusion in the policy, its position
was reaffirmed in Johnson v. Business Men's Assurance Co. of
America, 228 P.2d 760 (Wash. 1951), where recovery was denied
to a beneficiary whose insured died after making six to eight trips
into a burning house to salvage his household goods. The distinc-
tion was also applied in denying recovery in Whiteside v. New
York Life Insurance Co., 503 P.2d 1107 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972),
where an insured with a long history of drug use died from a self-
injected overdose of morphine and methedrine.
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West Virginia:
Makes the distinction. Floyd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soci-
ety, 264 S.E.2d 648 (W. Va. 1980); Dorsey v. Prudential Insur-
ance Co. of America, 19 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1942). See also
Walker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 272 F. Supp. 217
(S.D. W. Va. 1967).
Wisconsin:
Does not recognize the distinction. Stoffel v. American Family
Life Insurance Co., 164 N.W.2d 484 (Wis. 1969); O'Connell v.
New York Life Insurance Co., 264 N.W. 253 (Wis. 1936); Wiger v.
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 236 N.W. 534 (Wis. 1931).
Wyoming:
There do not appear to be any reported cases on point in the
Wyoming courts, but in Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Soci-
ety, 614 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1980) the court, applying Wyoming
law, said that death is 'accidental' if it were neither reasonably
foreseeable, nor the likely consequence of [the insured's] con-
duct." Id. at 723.
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